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Perversion by Penumbras: Wolfenden, Griswold, and the 
Transatlantic Trajectory of Sexual Privacy 
 
 
When in March 1961 the US Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Connecticut 
birth control law that prohibited the use of contraceptives, the majority of justices found no case 
or controversy at hand. The Connecticut statute, together with a provision condemning 
accomplices to crimes, had for years prevented the operation of birth control clinics in the state. 
None of the appellant couples, though, had been subject to police action and the court record did 
not reveal any prosecutions in the state for usage. Furthermore, contraceptives were commonly 
sold in Connecticut drug stores—“notoriously” so, as the court put it. Delivering the plurality’s 
opinion, Justice Frankfurter stressed: “This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning 
harmless, empty shadows.”1 
  Four years later, however, and the justices detected something more consequential in the 
gloaming. Indeed, by June 1965 the majority held that in the “penumbras” of the US 
constitution’s stated protections—in the light-dark interplay of “emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance”—lay a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.” In 
luminous literality, the federal constitution nowhere mentioned privacy directly. Yet in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court perceived a penumbral “zone of privacy” somewhere in the textual 
shadows that became decisive to the appeal of Planned Parenthood leaders, charged as accessories 
for providing married couples with birth control. This time the Supreme Court saw more than 
“harmless, empty shadows.” Rather, it insisted that “forbidding use of contraceptives violates the 
right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”2 
How the Supreme Court came to articulate a constitutional right to privacy is a great riddle 
of postwar US liberalism and sexual politics, but our explanations neglect a crucial piece of the 
puzzle. The most convincing accounts to date portray the court’s so-called “discovery” of the right 
as extending doctrinally from tort privacy cases centered on control of information and criminal 
procedure cases involving invasive police tactics.3 At the time of Griswold, these factors were 
enhanced through a tradition of US common law privacy commentary, the urgency of Cold War 
privacy anxieties, and not least birth control activist efforts. All of these aspects surely had 
influence and most can be readily seen in the court’s reasoning. My contention, however, is that a 
crucial additional factor lies in a twilight world beyond obvious sexual and sovereign borders—
namely, in the transatlantic diffusion of Britain’s 1957 Wolfenden Report on prostitution and 
homosexual offences.4 If I’m right, it means that a legislative call for the UK Parliament to 
                                                        
1 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
3 Among historians, Leigh Ann Wheeler’s account emphasizing the cross-pollination of these concerns sets the 
standard. Leigh Ann Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 93-119. 
4 For an indication of the broader possibilities that may be encompassed by transnational histories of sexuality or by 
queering a geographic field such as that presented by the “US in the world” see, among others, Elizabeth A. 
Povinelli and George Chauncey, “Thinking Sexuality Transnationally: An Introduction,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies 5:4 (1999), 439-49; Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, “Global Identities: Theorizing 
Transnational Studies of Sexuality,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 7:4 (2001), 663-79; Margot 
Canaday, “Thinking Sex in the Transnational Turn: An Introduction,” American Historical Review 114:5 (2009), 
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decriminalize homosexuality on account of a realm of private morality transformed into a US 
constitutional right to privacy protecting the use of contraceptives by married couples.5 
 Put so bluntly, it is unsurprising that scholarship on Griswold overlooks Wolfenden.6 
Nevertheless, a compelling case can be made that the British report’s utilitarian identification of a 
“realm of private morality and immorality which is…not the law’s business” helped shape what 
became apparent as a right within the US constitution.7 Scholars have occasionally noted in 
passing Wolfenden’s galvanizing effect on postwar US gay activists. This was indeed formidable, 
one Californian homophile journal asking on its November 1957 cover: “Is it a Magna Carta for 
Homosexuals?”8 But to the extent that queerness remains underappreciated as a consequential 
topic of historical enquiry beyond identity movements, it suits me to reveal its unsuspected 
centrality to the clear significance of privacy’s US constitutional recognition. Griswold did more 
than trumping an unusual state law honored largely in the breach; critics and admirers alike can 
view the decision as a judicial recalibration of private/public divides, traversing sexual lives and 
social contracts. Over the decades, it has proved both legally salient and politically controversial, 
enabling a distinctive line of constitutional interpretation of sometimes fiercely disputed 
legitimacy. For better or worse, Griswold intervened in fundamental relationships between 
intimacy, the state, morality, and law. Queerness, I will argue, helped underwrite its innovation. 
A figure of speech in Robert Self’s recent analysis of familial postwar US politics betrays a 
general historiographic trend largely oblivious to Wolfenden’s penumbral operation. Discussing 
Griswold, Self asserts that “[e]xtending either negative or positive rights to gay men and women 
remained unimaginable in American law and politics in the mid-Sixties.”9 Wolfenden’s 
                                                        
1250-7; and Laura Belmonte et al, “Colloquy: America in the World,” Diplomatic History 40:1 (2016), 19-80. 
5 Major works addressing the Wolfenden Report’s production, political philosophy, and effect on British sexual 
politics include: Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the 
Present (London: Quarter Books, 1977); Stuart Hall, “Reformism and the Legislation of Consent” in National 
Deviancy Conference (ed.), Permissiveness and Control: The Fate of Sixties Legislation (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 1980), 39; Patrick Higgins, Heterosexual Dictatorship: Male Homosexuality in Britain (London, Fourth 
Estate: 1996), Leslie J. Moran, The Homosexual(ity) of Law (London, Routledge, 1996); Derek McGhee, 
Homosexuality, Law & Resistance (London, Routledge, 2001); Matt Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and 
Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918-1957 (Chicago University Press, 2005); Frank Mort, Capital Affairs: 
London and the Making of the Permissive Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); and Roger Davidson 
and Gayle Davis, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). A 
critical sourcebook is also available: Brian Lewis, Wolfenden’s Witnesses: Homosexuality in Postwar Britain 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).   
6 Wolfenden’s role in precipitating a US constitutional privacy right is perhaps more intuitive to legal scholars than 
historians due to the jurisprudential importance of the so-called Hart-Devlin debate that followed the report, yet here 
too the significance of the link has become more obscure. For instance, while a 1980 law journal article on sex and 
the Burger Court briefly noted that contemporary legal commentators “immediately saw” Griswold as injecting the 
report’s privacy recommendation into constitutional law, a more recent article on doctrinal conditions enabling the 
decision mentions neither Wolfenden nor Hart-Devlin. I discuss their absence in more historically oriented accounts 
below. See Thomas C. Grey, “Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court,” Law and Contemporary Problems 43:3 
(Summer 1980), 84, and Ryan C. Williams, “The Paths to Griswold,” Nortre Dame Law Review 89:5, 2155-88.         
7 A related argument about the bearing of global human rights discourse on mid-century US judicial decisions is 
advanced in Mark Philip Bradley, The World Reimagined: Americans and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 2016).     
8 Mattachine Review, November 1957, cover. 
9 Self’s position here stands for the general trend in the historiography related to Griswold. Neither David Garrow’s 
magnum opus Liberty and Sexuality, nor John Johnson’s more recent Griswold vs. Connecticut reference either the 
   
 3 
prominence in contemporary US legal and public culture, however, suggests that the protection of 
gay sex was, if not realizable, eminently intelligible for lawyers, gay activists, and others—a 
proposition that I argue better explains the Supreme Court’s strenuous attempts to banish 
perversion from its own intuition of what a right to privacy contained. Homosexuality lurked 
behind Griswold not simply as the outlandish nightmare of where the justices’ discovery might lead, 
but also because the specter of gay sex had been so stimulating of transatlantic privacy talk in the 
first place. This basic trajectory provides a necessary corrective to our tendency to imagine histories 
of sexual politics as expanding outward to encompass the ever more marginalized, as plotted by the 
dates of headline reform. Even so impressive a study as Leigh Ann Wheeler’s How Sex Became a 
Civil Liberty, in taking the ACLU’s priorities as its own, implies a path whereby birth control 
politics in effect provided the originating font of sex as civil liberty. Yet, while often omitted from 
official records, homosexuality’s taboo status could give it outsized if unacknowledged power. 
From this angle, the protection of gay sex can indeed appear a precursor to, as well as a result of, 
other kinds of sexual privacy claims.10  
This article then shows how the transatlantic trajectory of the Wolfenden Report spurred a 
significant US legal and political shift towards legitimizing sexual privacy that subsequently 
resulted in constitutional rights to not only contraception, but also abortion and—decades later—
same-sex intimacy. In exploring the British report’s stateside reception, I pay particular attention to 
two groups proximate to its disturbance of constitutional doctrine: homophile activists and 
lawyers. The former had closely followed events in Britain since the Wolfenden Committee’s 
inception in early 1954 and were quick to see the report’s bearing on their own situation. Legal 
practitioners, commentators, and theorists, meanwhile, developed an expansive appreciation of 
Wolfenden’s privacy principle, transatlantic hubbub over Britain’s homosexual question 
translating into hundreds of references in law journals, textbooks, and debates that addressed 
subjects sometimes far removed from the homophile ambition of challenging state sodomy laws. 
Indeed, the notion that the criminal law had no business policing private gay sex, even when the 
majority of the community viewed it with disgust, raised questions touching on the very nature of 
law and its relation to morality. While by the time of Griswold Connecticut’s birth control 
prohibition was unusual among the states and its targeting of use unique, earlier US reform efforts 
had not depended on a claimed constitutional “right to sexual privacy”—an anachronistic 
expression on both sides of the Atlantic until the late 1950s. Wolfenden, transplanted from 
British utilitarian discussions to a US context of increasingly forceful civil rights claims, made it 
politically and doctrinally easier for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right in this 
area. But the queer source of stimulation also encouraged the justices to contain the emerging 
                                                        
Wolfenden Report or the subsequence Hart/Devlin debate over its jurisprudence. Michael Sandel’s chapter on 
“Privacy Rights and Family Law” in Democracy’s Discontent. Even William Eskridge’s recent work on sodomy 
laws, Dishonorable Passions, mentions the report only in passing. David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The 
Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); John. W. Johnson, 
Griswold v. Connecticut: Birth Control and the Constitutional Right of Privacy (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996); Robert O. Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American 
Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012); and William N. Eskridge, Dishonorable Passions: 
Sodomy Laws in America, 1861-2003 (New York: Penguin, 2008).       
10 Wheeler does briefly reference the Wolfenden Report on two occasions when citing ACLU sources, but presents 
cross-pollination from police intrusion cases (particularly Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)) as the explanation for 
an advocate-led innovation of constitutional sexual privacy. See Wheeler, 103.  
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right’s potential in the name of a supposedly natural and timeless marital privacy. 
The combination of homosexuality’s stigmatized silence and affective power in US culture 
between Wolfenden and Griswold requires a note about its presence in my sources. On the one 
hand, it would be surprising to see US advocates of birth control appealing to homosexual 
precedent directly; lawyers anxious to argue their best case before judges had strong incentive to 
separate themselves from a more abject issue than their own cause, especially when there was some 
relation between the two. It is not therefore surprising that historians who lead with the briefs of 
birth control activists or the papers of Supreme Court justices tell a different story than I do.  
Constitutional decisions, however, do not derive from these sites alone. Rather, my 
argument rests on Wolfenden’s role in the cultural cloud-seeding of an atmosphere that made a 
privacy right conceptually legible and politically realizable.11 Indeed, I want to suggest the relevance 
to constitutional penumbras of a queer studies approach that reads between the lines of public 
cultures saturated by queerness while suppressing open mention. I find an ally here in legal scholar 
David Alan Sklansky who, in explaining the 1967 Supreme Court decision in Katz on the privacy 
protections of a telephone booth, persuasively establishes a subtext of growing judicial unease with 
anti-gay policing that transgressed the privacy expected in washroom stalls. Sklansky, taking 
inspiration from the clear role policing of African-Americans played in criminal procedure reform 
beyond its overt citation in mid-century legal texts, also draws on the foundational work of queer 
studies scholar Eve Sedgwick, who forcefully repositioned the “nominally marginal” matter of 
“hetero/homosexual definition” as central to “modern Western culture.”12 And homosexuality, 
more than simply operating as a “secret subtext,” also presents a “subtext about secrets.”13 In other 
words, we may detect, as Sedgwick claimed and as Sklansky reiterates, a “distinctly indicative 
relation of homosexuality to wider mappings of secrecy and disclosure, and of the private and the 
public.” Its bearing on mid-1960s legal thought about privacy could be substantive and reflexive.14  
The Supreme Court itself barely referenced homosexuality until the 1980s, and its only 
direct intervention prior to Griswold was a terse 1958 reversal of a decision that had ruled a 
homophile magazine obscene.15 That hardly means, however, that queerness could be ignored. As 
Marc Stein has noted, many of the Warren Court justices had close encounters with 
                                                        
11 A similar move is made by new “demoprudence” scholarship bridging legal judgments and a broader public 
sphere of social activism. For instance, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres in “Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a 
Demoprudence of Law and Social Movements,” Yale Law Journal 123:8 (June 2014) argue that African-American 
civil rights and social justice movements in the 1950s and 1960s did not simply influence formal legal changes, but 
in effect were sources of law, ensuring certain legal conclusions became inevitable. But homophiles had neither the 
connections to power of Martin Luther King, nor the ability to project the moral authority of the movement he 
represented. Although in this article I am advancing a different relationship between homosexuality’s cultural 
position and the law—one that avoids strong claims about law’s top-down bearing on identity—legal scholars who 
have considered homophile interaction with the US court system categorize litigation as largely defensive until 
around the time of Griswold, after which affirmative impact-type litigation became more common. See William N. 
Eskridge, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) and Craig 
J. Konnoth, “Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the 1950s-1970s,” Yale 
Law Journal 119:2 (2009).        
12 David Alan Sklansky, ‘One Train May Hide Another’: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal 
Procedure,” UC Davis Law Review 41:3 (2008), 875-934. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet  
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 1-2. 
13 Sklansky, 878, after Sedgwick, 22.  
14 Sedgwick, 71.  
15 Sklansky, 897-9. One, Inc. v. Olesen 355 U.S. 371 (1958). 
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homosexuality.16 More significantly, from the late 1950s to early 1960s the subject began to receive 
greater media attention in the United States than ever before, even as it retained an aura of 
dubiety and indeterminacy. Earlier episodes of devastating Lavender Scare rumour mills and 
innuendo-laden flare ups did anticipate later dynamics, not least when revived by a 1964 scandal 
surrounding presidential aide Walter Jenkins.17 But in terms of sheer quantity of reference, the 
years immediately preceding Griswold precipitated a seismic shift in the US publicity of 
homosexuality. Radio programs, TV documentaries, magazine articles, and the breakdown of 
Hollywood’s Hays Code all helped to expose gay subculture’s sophisticated modes of discretion 
while compelling even more self-conscious, if less censorial, cultural policing of the still mysterious 
and potentially porous boundaries of homosexual difference. The threatened permeability of 
homosexuality’s unnatural shame and its assumed contrast to the transparent self-evidence of 
heterosexuality suggests why ascendant signification could continue to inspire visions of a 
suspended, twilight world. D. A. Miller for one has argued that in the postwar period 
homosexuality’s “dusky existence” obtained unique distinction as “subject matter whose 
representation in American mass culture appertained exclusively to the shadow kingdom of 
connotation, where institutions could be at once developed and denied.”18 Amidst sexuality’s 
heightened intimations, little was so revealing as lingering ambiguity, Lee Edelman describing the 
interplay of a double cultural imperative that both marked gay male bodies and registered their 
indeterminacy.19 Although Wolfenden circulated close to the Supreme Court, its influence 
possessed something of the open secret that disturbed and fascinated without being named, 
interest itself rendering the onlooker suspect.  
Wolfenden was not the only factor producing Griswold, but its queer penumbral influence 
should be brought out of the shadows of this particular Supreme Court noir. The establishment of 
a right to privacy may seem overdetermined, but two judges dissented, two concurred without 
joining the majority opinion, and other remedies were possible. As Planned Parenthood counsel 
Catherine Roraback remembered it, privacy had barely been on the radar in the late 1950s for 
those strategizing the demise of Connecticut’s birth control law, and its subsequent arrival as a 
constitutional right struck even its advocates as far from automatic.20 Yes, postwar US 
commentators routinely cast privacy invasion as a hallmark of Soviet totalitarianism amidst their 
own intensifying anxieties about “cold war surveillance in the realms of gender and sexuality,” as 
Deborah Nelson has argued.21 And yes, the Supreme Court cited these concerns in Griswold and 
furthermore leant heavily on a famed US tradition of legal commentary initiated by the 1890 
article of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis titled “The Right to Privacy.” But despite the 
obvious bearing of these concerns on the decision, we shouldn’t lose sight of the contingent 
articulation of so loose a concept as a fundamental right—least of all by unelected justices who 
                                                        
16 Marc Stein, Sexual Injustice: Supreme Court Decisions from Griswold to Roe (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), 10-3. 
17 David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal 
Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 197-9. 
18 D. A. Miller, “Anal Rope,” Representations 32 (1990), 119. 
19 Lee Edelman, Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge, 1994), 9-11, 
237. 
20 Catherine Roraback, “Catherine G. Roraback, “Griswold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History,” Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 16:3 (1989): 395-401. 
21 Deborah Nelson, Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 13. 
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risked the accusation of rewriting the constitution.22  
Wolfenden indeed helped both to tip the political balance for recognition and to shape 
what Griswold’s right to privacy meant amidst other factors whose influence is less determinant 
than historians often recognize. Even Warren and Brandeis’s article, legal scholar James Whitman 
has argued, is best viewed “not as a great American innovation, but as an unsuccessful continental 
transplant,” given US law’s reluctance to adopt its overriding concern with a European-inflected 
privacy right protecting dignity from insult.23 And in Griswold, contraception’s case for 
constitutional innovation came with the baggage of failing to present a live controversy four years 
earlier in Poe. Leigh Ann Wheeler makes a compelling case that procedural objections to police 
search and seizure cases—in particular 1961’s Mapp v. Ohio—encouraged the ACLU to think inter-
topically about privacy’s relation to constitutional law and demonstrates that Connecticut birth 
control activists also drew connections to bedroom surveillance.24 Yet in Poe the court had already 
cast such threats as chimerical, while contraception’s entwinement with disease control and 
demography muddied the separation from state interest a right to privacy would assert. The 
surveillance and arrest of men for gay sex, by contrast, clearly presented an actual occurrence, one 
that brightly raised where the private/public dividing lines of sex for pleasure’s sake might lie. As 
Anna Lvovsky has shown, cruising grounds in the mid-1960s presented judges below the US 
Supreme Court with public order and policing questions that could turn on, for example, whether 
any formation of water closet architecture amounted to protected private space.25 But with many 
gay men taking obvious pains to hide their sex lives from view, their criminalization sharply posed 
whether moral standards in themselves justified law. 
 Penumbras amount to more than judicial side-eye, their association with eclipses evoking 
shifts in worldview. While my argument regarding Wolfenden’s bearing on Griswold advances 
primarily through a deliberative reading of the traction its jurisprudential outlook gained in the 
US legal system, the broader operation of a cultural filter capable of producing the below stateside 
rendition should not be underestimated:  
 
 
FIGURE 1: Cover of The Wolfenden Report (New York: Lancer Books, 1963) removed for copyright 
reasons. 
 
There are of course many acts of translation that transformed the British official enquiry’s 
standardized blue book into “A BOLD STUDY OF ABNORMAL SEX” with its dubious claim to 
bestseller status, its genealogical appeal to Alfred Kinsey, its imprimatur by US sociology, and its 
repackaging by Karl Menninger – a prominent Kansan psychiatrist whose introduction cast 
homosexuality (contrary to the report) as an illness and ranked “high in the kingdom of evils.” But 
important here too is the double move of sensation and secrets that constitutes its visual prurience 
                                                        
22 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4:5 (1890). Later as a Supreme 
Court justice, Brandeis made a further influential articulation of this purported right through his dissent in the 
wiretapping case Olmstead v. United States 277 US 438 (1928). 
23 James Q. Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,” Yale Law Journal 113:6 
(2004), 1204.  
24 Wheeler, 96-105. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
25 Anna Lvovsky, “Cruising in Plain View: Clandestine Surveillance and the Unique Insights of Antihomosexual 
Policing,” Journal of Urban History (2017).  
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and suggests an analogue to how privacy became named as a thing. The design here went beyond 
simply being garish in its bold type and neon colours, the design almost simulating the title sheet 
being ripped off to reveal burning indiscretions beneath. It was an aesthetic carried over to a 
blared announcement on the inside page: “THEY LIVE IN THE SHADOWS.” This US 
pocketbook edition of course provided just one mode of Wolfenden’s transatlantic transmission as 
Connecticut birth control law came under judicial scrutiny and probably had little legal, let alone 
constitutional, bearing in itself. Yet as one of many contemporary urges to make homosexuality 
textual, it formed part of cultural front that could wrest active, positive protection of privacy from 
opposition prone to framing rights in terms of nature and original intent. As Wolfenden’s 
penumbral force grew inescapable, it resonated with an unwritten constitutional right found 





Appreciating the overarching trajectory of Wolfenden’s transatlantic journey requires an initial 
account of the report’s production and release, itself inflected with transnationalism, as we shall 
see. The finished report, of course, constituted a sensational package, and it is easy to grasp why a 
1950s official British enquiry recommending decriminalization of gay sex would attract media 
attention abroad. In the United States, imagined Anglo-American legal inheritance and a 
formidable infrastructure of law schools and journals would also encourage engagement with the 
report’s striking contribution to liberal jurisprudence, especially given US Cold War boosterism 
for the rule of law. But radical adaptation remained possible. For one thing, the Wolfenden 
Committee viewed the subject of homosexual offences through a utilitarian weighing of social 
positives and negatives, asking what purpose the law served, whether it was enforceable, and (to 
some extent) whether it caused unnecessary pain. By contrast, a US rights culture reacting to the 
due process violations of McCarthyism and bolstered in public consciousness by the African-
American civil rights movement had strong potential to rearticulate the report in terms of a 
particular right.27           
 From a number of angles, the committee’s inauguration itself suggests the report’s later 
propensity to travel. Dominant explanations for why Churchill’s government initiated an enquiry 
into the law on homosexual offences and prostitution argue the move was more about shelving an 
unsavory political problem than solving it. It aimed, in other words, at containment. Yet if the 
1954 creation of this twelve-man, three-woman enquiry meeting in camera might abate immediate 
political concern over rising recorded sexual offences and prominent gay scandals, the novelty of 
Wolfenden’s queer mission was still imbued with potent symbolism that reached beyond Britain.28 
Even before the enquiry was announced, major US newspapers among other foreign media had 
noted England’s spate of vice sensations, which included the 1953 arrest of actor John Gielgud for 
solicitation and the 1954 convictions of peer Edward Montagu and journalist Peter Wildeblood 
                                                        
26 Karl Menninger introduction to The Wolfenden Report (New York: Lancer Books, 1963), 9. 
27 For a reading of the utilitarian philosophical approach underpinning the final report, see Mark Tebbit, Philosophy 
of Law: An Introduction (London: Routlege, 2000). 
28 By the end of 1953 publicity of both scandals and numbers produced a number of significant calls to initiate 
reform. See Kingsley Martin, “Society and the Homosexual,” 31 October 1953, 508; “Homosexuality,” Observer, 
15 November 1953; and “A Social Problem,” Sunday Times, 1 November 1953, 6. 
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for gross indecency. And before the committee had convened, one reader of the Chicago-based 
Christian Century felt emboldened to write to its appointed chair—Reading University head John 
Wolfenden—to stress that “social evils are not confined by political boundaries.” He wasn’t the 
only foreigner to emphasize the cross-border import of the committee’s task. With a different 
agenda, a recently formed international homophile organization in Amsterdam forwarded research 
to Wolfenden indicating that “in a modern world the rights of important minority-groups are on 
the way to be fully recognized.” Although the British enquiry declined to interview its leader, the 
International Committee for Sexual Equality (ICSE) assured its own supporters it had “done 
everything in its power to approach the committee.”29 
 The ICSE’s strenuous effort reflected the significance of Britain’s state inquiry to 
homophile groups springing up in the West, even where (as in the Netherlands) gay sex between 
consenting adults was legal and homophile clubhouses enjoyed official sanction. But the group’s 
intervention and brief invocation of rights was always likely to fall on deaf ears. From the outside, 
the Wolfenden Committee appeared to present the first significant opportunity for homophiles to 
influence debate on the international stage since the ICSE’s inaugural conference in 1951. Then, 
via telegram, it had called on the United Nations to extend “human, social and legal equality to 
homosexual minorities throughout the world” in the wake of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 30 Five years later and the ICSE’s memo to Wolfenden invoked individualist claims as well 
as ethnic minority protections as it questioned whether legislators should “intervene in the most 
intimate and individual expression of the human being when his activities and his actions are 
neither individually nor socially a danger.”31 The ICSE’s overall emphasis though fell on 
utilitarian-driven European penal code reform; its appeal was to a broad calculation of social well-
being rather than an individual or minority group right trumping other considerations. But the 
nature of the organization would have rendered its judgment suspicious to British elites. Among 
the most crucial acts bringing the Wolfenden Committee into being was a 1954 Church of 
England call for homosexual law reform in part on the grounds that current criminal penalties 
were creating an aggrieved “self-conscious minority,” contrary to the “British conception of 
sociological principle.”32 The ICSE’s obvious self-interest and perceived subjectivity cut against an 
Establishment enquiry that favored supposedly disinterested officials and professionals who 
claimed to act for the public as a whole.33  
Such a “British conception,” however, did not mean that the committee was oblivious to 
the significance of foreign viewpoints or experience. While other scholars have linked the report’s 
recommendation to the committee’s experience of London street culture and queer friends and 
                                                        
29 “Committee Named to Investigate Homosexuality, Prostitution,” Christian Century, 29 September 1954, 1183. 
Clarence C. Case to Vice-Chancellor Wolfenden, 1 November 1954), HO 345/2, British National Archives 
(hereafter BNA). International Committee for Sexual Equality, bulletin, July 1955, 4. 
30 For text, see the cover of Der Kreis, July 1951, reprinted in Leila Rupp, “The Persistence of Transnational 
Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement,” American Historical Review 116:4 (October 2011), 1016. 
31 Memo from ICSE to Wolfenden Committee, [25 June 1955], HO 345/8, BNA. On the broad international 
conceptual shift from interwar minority rights to postwar human rights, see Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph 
of Human Rights, 1933-1950,” The Historical Journal 47:2 (2004). 
32 Church of England Moral Welfare Committee, The Problem of Homosexuality: An Interim Report by a Group of 
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family members, international visions also shaped its outlook and increased the prospect of 
subsequent influence on the international scene.34 Although the secretary dismissed agreements 
such as the United Nations protocol on sex trafficking and the European Convention on Human 
Rights as irrelevant, consciousness of homosexuality’s legal and cultural position in other countries 
asserted itself from the very first interview. Here, barrister Kenneth Diplock provided his 
colleagues with a hasty run down on Europe’s Code Napoleon regimes, where private gay sex was 
legal. And the desire to know more about the broad implications of legal reform led the committee 
to make formal enquiries at embassies for the Netherlands, Sweden, and West Germany, and the 
report’s eventual appendices contained included a summary of European laws. Beyond simply 
sourcing comparative information, an international outlook sometimes exposed the transnational 
currents informing liberal convictions. Diplock, for instance, noted that Germany’s severe 
persecution of homosexuals had been instituted “under Hitler.” Labour politician William Wells 
urged that the final report should emphasize that “the only European countries where the law is 
the same as it is here are Russia, which has never known a free society, and Germany, which 
destroyed it in the 1930s.” Such positions aligned with a broader British reaction to the privacy 
invasions and public slurs of US McCarthyism, that elsewhere even extended to a degree of 
recognition of Washington’s Lavender Scare.35  
That alignment also inflected an encounter with US sex researcher Alfred Kinsey, who 
bolstered the case for regarding a certain degree of homosexual freedom as a necessary part of 
Western postwar liberalism. Kinsey’s opening remarks to a specially convened subset of the 
committee emphasized that no international evidence indicated that decriminalizing private gay 
sex increased the incidence of homosexuality, heading off a consistent witness fear. By contrast, 
Kinsey’s account of US sodomy laws, sexual psychopath legislation, and public indecency statutes 
prompted the committee’s leading medical expert to remark upon “the ferocity of anti-homosexual 
laws” in the United States. This influential member of the enquiry later told Kinsey that his 
testimony was “quite the most informative morning that we have had.” The US professor, who 
had taken a strong interest in Britain since the 1953 homosexual scandals, in turn reported to his 
colleagues at the Institute for Sex Research that “as a Commission there is no doubt of their 
liberality,” and he expected them to recommend decriminalization. Signaling the weight of 
transatlantic effects that his own witness testimony also evidenced, he affirmed that “this sort of 
thing will strengthen the hands of all countries.”36     
The imprimatur of the British state and a sensational recommendation would have been 
enough in themselves to give Wolfenden formidable momentum on its release. We miss much of 
the potential impact of the report’s international influence, however, if we overlook its method of 
justification. Leading with a jurisprudential contention largely beyond the scope of its evidence, 
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the committee asserted that it was not “the function of the law to intervene in the private lives of 
citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behavior” further than was necessary to 
preserve public order, punish the obscene, and protect the vulnerable.37 This reflected a utilitarian 
position, based on public good rather than individual rights, but it was also a principle that might 
seem effectively to mandate decriminalization, rather than simply favoring it on balance. Witnesses 
could protest that homosexual behavior directly menaced the health of society, damaged family 
life, and promoted the seduction of children, or that law reform would open “the floodgates” of 
license. But since the committee concluded they hadn’t proved this, the report’s jurisprudence 
compelled the statement for which it became most famous: 
 
There remains one counter-argument which we believe to be decisive, namely, the importance which 
society ought to give to individual freedom of choice and action in matters of private morality. 
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the agency of the law, to equate 
the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality 
which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business.38  
 
By deploying the expression “private morality and immorality,” the report emphasized the 
impossibility of evading moral reckoning while crucially advancing a stark separation of morality 
and law. The policing of homosexuals transgressed this separation in egregiously invasive ways. 
Private homosexuality, however defined, would need to cause palpable social harm to fall foul of 
the principle. Following the ICSE’s memo, the committee went so far as to ask the Dutch embassy 
whether homophile clubs in the Netherlands constituted a public nuisance, but learnt that police 
there believed such legitimation of adult contacts lowered delinquency. More cautious, the 
Wolfenden Report drew up privacy narrowly, suggesting strong spatial conditions and an extent 
bounded by two people, with street walking providing the contrast as a clear public nuisance.  
Once again, this top-down delineation of privacy did not consider itself to redistribute 
power in the form of a right to gay men; nevertheless, the acknowledgement of private sanctuary 
around the previously criminalized could be suggestive of such when seen through different 
interpretive eyes. Just as the Wolfenden Report’s reasoning stood unbeholden to whatever law 
reform preferences witnesses advanced once it had rejected their assertion of harm, so the aspiring 
universalism of its privacy principle easily detached from the nation.39  
 In Britain, the immediate impact of this “vice report” was sensational, but the path to 
homosexual law reform was slow, with advocates appealing to British “civilized” values above 
rights. When in 1960 Parliament first debated Wolfenden’s proposals on homosexual offences, the 
first (and almost only) mention of rights was by an opponent of reform who—far from invoking 
individual protections against the state—asserted that “[s]ociety has certain rights and standards 
which it is entitled to enforce,” including the “right as a country to do all we can within humanity 
to discourage homosexuals.” One advocate did urge the Commons to “be jealous of the rights of 
minorities,” but the final call for reform warned instead of the risk Parliament would take standing 
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“against the general current of civilised world opinion.” The motion was defeated 213 to 99 and 
Parliament did not pass Wolfenden-style legislation until 1967. Meanwhile, the Homosexual Law 
Reform Society (HLRS) lobbied predominantly against an ill-functioning law that promoted 
arbitrary prosecutions, blackmail, and suicide rather than the unjust transgression of rights.40 
 Long before British law reform, however, strong transatlantic currents transported 
Wolfenden to the United States, where the criminalization of sodomy was paired to a rights 
culture prone to reading the report differently. Indeed, those US homophiles who asked whether 
the report was “a Magna Carta for homosexuals” followed the American Bar Association’s unusual 
move to hold its annual conference in London in the summer of 1957, whereupon it gifted the 
British a monument commemorating the “great charter of liberties.” This it described as “the first 
effective written statement of that concept of individual liberty under law which is basic to Anglo-
American jurisprudence,” a fundamental principle now safely enshrined in the US Constitution.41 
US newspapers gave prominent play to the conference attended by 3,000 lawyers and three 
Supreme Court justices, including Chief Justice Earl Warren, who in one of the recent “Red 
Monday” cases had affirmed a right of personal freedom that curbed congressional power to 
investigate an individual’s private affairs.42 US advocates rhapsodizing over England as the font of 
legal liberty were soon chased back across the ocean by the newly released Wolfenden Report, its 




Media coverage provided an important route for Wolfenden’s transatlantic transmission, 
aggregating over years to produce an ambient stateside presence. Initial US reports were fitful, but 
they also provided contrasting tones to sensationalist British counterparts and treated Wolfenden’s 
articulation of privacy itself as news. The second sentence of the New York Times’ initial story, for 
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instance, drew direct attention to the broad division between law and morals that grounded the 
report’s attitude to homosexuality, while a front-page subhead in the New York Herald Tribune 
directly stated the privacy rationale, with Newsday using the same United Press wire to quote the 
committee at length on the separation of law and private life. Many US publications continued to 
track British reactions and in doing so reiterated the privacy principle, a Washington Post editorial 
at the end of November summarizing the committee contention that “the private immoralities of 
British subjects are not the proper concern of lawmakers and law enforcers.” Long-form “Letter 
from London” and opinion pieces extended Wolfenden’s early impact, so that by the end of 1958 
the New Yorker’s British correspondent described the report to US readers as “famous.”44 As 
Parliament limbered up for debate on prostitution and then homosexuality, Wolfenden’s stateside 
celebrity was bolstered by periodic media references, citations in books, and eventually commercial 
editions of the report itself.45 US spins were not necessarily positive, of course, and when in late 
1958 the New York Times ran a story on a Foreign Office aide held in London on a “morals 
charge,” it positioned the report more as symptom than solution, using it to justify the claim that 
“homosexuality in Britain is a major social problem.” Still, most commentators recognized a 
certain authority in the committee process, the San Francisco Bishop James Pike in 1961 citing the 
report approvingly during the first documentary on homosexuality to be broadcast on US 
television. Indeed, the report’s reputation became such that its absence from a 1962 radio program 
on homosexuality could seem almost as notable as the novel inclusion of gay men. By the early 
1960s, Wolfenden had established itself in the United States as a regular and even expected 
reference in newly prominent public discussions of homosexuality.46   
Wolfenden’s potential to promote a shift towards seeing sexual privacy as a right was even 
more clearly registered by a homophile subculture that had great interest in the US reception of 
the report, while lacking traction with the authorities.47 Even if not articulating a “right to privacy” 
per se, many US homophiles quickly saw Wolfenden as assisting their assertion of a fundamental 
freedom to be gay behind closed doors. The Mattachine Review (whose very first cover in January 
1955 quoted Jefferson on the potential need to alter constitutions) had published for years articles 
on civil rights, demands for individual privacy, and British developments before offering the 
November 1957 Magna Carta coverline. Future issues devoted extensive space to analysis of and 
reaction to the report, an interest that lesbian journal The Ladder shared despite Wolfenden’s male-
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oriented approach to homosexuality.48 Meanwhile, ONE Magazine—the most trenchant and widely 
read US homophile publication of the 1950s—had spent years scouring the Constitution for 
guarantees that might overturn “prejudiced, outmoded and unenforceable statutes” and fend off 
“waves of persecution during which…basic legal rights may be totally ignored.” It immediately 
recognized and applauded the report’s central statement that it was not “the function of the law to 
intervene in the private lives of citizens” as bolstering its case (while also critiquing the implication 
that private homosexuality was immoral).49 And the Wolfenden Report’s superlative significance to 
homophile assertions of a legitimate and rights-bearing homosexual identity is also conveyed by its 
sustained prevalence in US homophile circles, with Britain’s failure to enact law reform barely 
diminishing the document’s symbolic significance. By 1963 Wolfenden possessed such iconic 
status in the movement that a further homophile article on the report held that it had been “so 
widely discussed” that “to analyze or summarize its contents here would be tautology to an 
extreme.” Still, it went on: “Never has there been a more comprehensive, a more exhaustive, a 
more deliberately thorough, nor more emotionally detached examination of homosexuality and 
society, in general, and homosexuality and the law, in particular, than is contained in this report.” 
Wolfenden would continue to hold sway as the homophile movement entered a new phase of 
assertive activism signified by the “civil rights and social liberties” theme of a 1964 conference 
organized by East Coast homophiles.50 
 Other parties invested in sexual regulation had greater political potential to amplify the 
Wolfenden effect than marginalized homophiles, even if they were less prone to blur the report’s 
import with rights claims. The American Law Institute (ALI)—which brought together judges, 
lawyers, and scholars in a project to rationalize the criminal law—was one such locus of legal reform 
energy. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—with a history of fighting birth control 
restrictions through First Amendment grounds of free speech—was another. While on 
Wolfenden’s publication the latter remained reticent about viewing homosexuality as a civil 
liberties issue, the former had by 1955 already removed sodomy laws from the tentative Model 
Penal Code it was drafting as a blueprint for US states (a fact brought to the Wolfenden 
Committee’s attention by lawyers associated with Britain’s Labour Party). Yet if the ALI’s 
provisional revision shows that many US legal minds could imagine decriminalizing sodomy by the 
mid-1950s, it also proved a fiercely contested point of controversy.51  
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Wolfenden helped change this political calculus. As recently as January 1957 the ACLU 
had formally adopted a statement recognizing that “overt acts of homosexuality constitute a 
common law felony and that there is no constitutional prohibition against such state and local 
laws.” Wolfenden, though, implicitly challenged its whole vision that legislative judgments as to 
the criminality of sexual and reproductive acts (including abortion) were beyond its own concerns, 
justified as reflections of community attitudes. By May 1958, the ACLU’s legal director Roland 
Watts discussed the report with a gay man fired from his job, labeling Wolfenden’s privacy 
position “the enlightened view,” even as he conceded that the ACLU “has not yet seen fit” to take 
laws to the contrary as “an invasion of an individual’s civil liberties so as to warrant our 
intercession.” Watts directed the man to homophile groups instead. But the tantalizing “not yet” 
itself indicated the pressure Wolfenden’s privacy principle applied, which Watts turned on his 
ACLU colleagues and the ALI’s leaders. Indeed, days after receiving the gay man’s letter, he 
upbraided the Model Penal Code drafters for not strengthening their position in favor of 
decriminalizing private, consensual sexual conduct.52 By this point, the ALI leadership were well 
aware of Wolfenden’s impact in Britain, its director (who had attended the ABA’s London 
conference) telling a co-drafter that the “London papers were full of it.”53 When in 1961 Illinois 
became the first US state to revoke its sodomy law through penal code reform similar to the ALI’s 
blueprint, the state drafting subcommittee acted partly under Wolfenden’s influence. The next 
year, when the ALI finalized the Model Penal Code, its co-drafter justified the absence of sodomy 
prohibitions to fellow lawyers as having “the support of the famous Wolfenden Report.”54 
 These discussions among advocates and reformers for the most part fell short of invoking a 
“right to privacy,” yet under Wolfenden’s influence such a locution was becoming more possible. 
Hence the significance of ACLU legal counsel Melvin Wulf’s ostensible refusal in March 1959 to 
be drawn on whether the organization might change its position on homosexuality as a civil liberty 
“in light of the English Wolfenden Report.” Here, before his own         involvement in the 
unreasonable search claim of Mapp v. Ohio, Wulf acknowledged that “the attitude towards the 
right to privacy reflected in the Wolfenden Report is evidence of a growing social uneasiness 
concerning the intrusion of the state into the private behavior of its citizens.” The Wolfenden 
Report in this correspondence had prompted a clear articulation of a “right to privacy”—this from 
a man who, in drafting the ACLU’s amicus brief for the case preceding Griswold, soon pressed the 
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Both national press coverage of Wolfenden and particular activist responses to it made important 
contributions to legitimizing sexuality as a civil liberties issue. Yet somewhere between these two 
scales, Wolfenden seeded another atmosphere precipitating constitutional privacy, with law 
journals and law schools registering an important shift in the legal surrounds to Supreme Court 
decision-making. Indeed, in the years before Griswold Wolfenden’s central concerns percolated 
steadily through US law reviews, complementing the detailed assessments of British counterparts, 
with journals from Alabama to Yale referencing the report in long-form articles or short book 
reviews. Sensational subject matter paired with jurisprudential pointedness fired legal minds in 
both targeted and expansive ways. Substantive, procedural, and philosophical concerns all fed the 
legal system context for privacy’s imagination as a right.56  
Even in discussions of homosexuality and prostitution, legal commentators often viewed 
Wolfenden as more than a technical policy document or menu of legislative upgrades—a quality 
they sometimes contrasted to the ALI’s model penal code. For instance, in a themed 1960 issue of 
Duke’s Law and Contemporary Problems on sex offenses that cited Wolfenden several times, one 
contributor stressed that it was “important, even vital, to keep abreast of British developments as 
we carry on our American discussion of sex ethics and sex law.” Indeed, this writer, found that 
while the ALI draft recommendations “lean heavily in the direction of the English ones….[they] 
seem to lack the sharp edge and clarity we need to reach and explore the issues at stake.” 
Meanwhile, an article in the Ohio State Law Journal taking aim at the local sexual psychopath law 
described Wolfenden as an epochal reframing of manners and morals in which “the age admits the 
defects of the extant social order and is led toward a more enlightened approach in the area 
examined.” While these US commentators expressed few qualms cheerleading for a British report 
they associated with a rational approach to sexual ethics and regulation, Wolfenden’s influence 
went beyond those already supporting its policy recommendations. One Nebraskan legal scholar 
writing in a national periodical held that the report’s most important effect was its “signal 
contribution to the realm of popular ideas about the real functions of the criminal law.” The 
quantity of citations and the quality of praise began to resemble something of an incipient 
paradigm shift rebalancing private lives, community morality, and law.57 
 A sign and powerful stimulant of this transpired with a British legal debate inspired by 
Wolfenden’s privacy principle that quickly attained transatlantic proportions. On one side stood 
High Court judge Patrick Devlin, who had given evidence to the committee and cited it in the 
published version of lectures he gave at Yale Law School in September 1957.58 Devlin’s stellar 
stateside reputation was such that Chief Justice Warren and other Supreme Court justices 
travelled to Connecticut to hear him speak, while the American College of Trial Lawyers 
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published—with the apparent backing of Justice Frankfurter—Devlin’s summation of a highly 
publicized British murder trial as a model for its members.59 Devlin thus had acquired a distinctive 
fame among US lawyers when he used a 1958 British Academy lecture to reject Wolfenden’s 
separation of morality and law, arguing instead that society legitimately criminalized acts for which 
a reasonable man felt “intolerance, indignation and disgust”. Indeed, for Devlin’s natural law 
vision of a cohesive Christian society the suppression of vice bore comparison to the suppression 
of treason. And in Britain, treason already had a distinctly queer air given the recent exposure in 
multiple senses of Soviet spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.60  
On the debate’s other side stood Oxford Professor of Jurisprudence Herbert Hart, who 
took up Wolfenden’s part against Devlin’s assault. While less prominent than Devlin, Hart’s star 
among US legal scholars had risen when he delivered a striking defense of legal positivism through 
the prestigious Holmes Lecture at Harvard in April 1957. His insistence there on separating “what 
the law actually is” from normative claims of “what the law should be” prompted a famous 
response from Lon Fuller, Harvard’s foremost advocate of natural law, their exchange acquiring 
legal celebrity in part through a dramatic disagreement over the status of Nazi law in postwar 
Germany.61 The subsequent Hart-Devlin debate developed from a similar mix of far-reaching 
philosophical principles, lively political implications, and striking rhetoric. Delivered over BBC 
radio, Hart’s opening salvo picked up on Devlin’s comparison of the suppression of vice to 
suppression of treason. While Western Cold War public culture was prone to conflate 
homosexuality and subversion, Hart’s attack on Devlin’s absurd invocation of “private treason” 
channeled British liberal reaction to the invasiveness of such Lavender Scares.62 Personal as well as 
political and intellectual concerns likely motivated the intervention; in the 1930s, Hart had 
confessed an angst-ridden attraction to men while courting his wife. But while this anxiety 
continued to manifest itself in private diaries, it left only faint—or indeed penumbral—traces in 
Hart’s public writing.63 
Legal commentators who straddled the Atlantic quickly indicated their sense of the 
emerging Hart-Devlin debate’s jurisprudential heft, assisted by Anglo-American institutional ties. 
While Yale Law School Dean Eugene Rostow confusedly attempted to rescue Devlin for US 
liberals from a number of assailants,64 a commentator writing on “The British Experience” in Law 
                                                        
59 Patrick Devlin, “The Trial Judge,” Connecticut Bar Journal 31:4 (December 1957). Summing Up of the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Devlin (American College of Trial Lawyers, 1957). A review of Devlin’s later book The 
Enforcement of Morals (London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965) by a US district court judge recalled 
that “[Devlin’s] summing-up in the trial of Dr. John Bodkin Adam so much excited the admiration of Justice 
Frankfurter that, to meet his request, Lord Evershed persuaded the Treasury to have the summation transcribed, and 
the United States Supreme Court supplied copies as models to trial judges.” Review, Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr., 
University of Toronto Law Journal 16:2 (1966), 455-61. 
60 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 17.   
61 Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 197-202. 
62 H.L.A. Hart, “Immorality and Treason,” Listener, 30 July 1959, 162-3. 
63 Although Lacey’s formidable biography sometimes downplays Hart’s homoerotic attractions, perhaps in 
deference to Hart’s wife and children, it provides considerable evidence of their significance to him. See Lacey, 61-
2, 73-6, 194, 203-5.    
64 Eugene Rostow, “The Enforcement of Morals,” Cambridge Law Journal 18:2 (November 1960), 174-98. Rostow 
stated that the paper developed through invited talks at British universities during the previous academic year, 
including a lunch with Hart and guests at Oxford. Another early participant highlighting Anglo-American legal ties 
was Norman St. John-Stevas, A British scholar who developed his book Life, Death and the Law: Law and 
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and Contemporary Problems had by 1960 clearly identified the main positions and protagonists.65 
Soon after, a March 1961 Yale Law Journal article on “Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior” 
drew on Wolfenden and Hart-Devlin to analyze a District of Columbia indecency case in which a 
man was, in effect, entrapped in his own home, citing a substantial number of British sources 
coalescing into an “enforcement of morals” debate.66 US interest indeed extended the encounter 
and helped to establish it as a distinctive phenomenon, with Devlin and Hart both delivering 
named lectures at US law schools. The Hart-Devlin debate was a pronouncedly transatlantic 
production in its questioning of how community moral standards related to criminal law, where 
potential state transgressions of individual freedom were so pronounced.67   
As the terms of debate settled, the Supreme Court decision in Poe v. Ullman further 
inspired activists about privacy’s potential constitutional career. The court, as we saw, declined to 
overturn a Connecticut statute banning contraception usage and privacy played only a small role 
in the appellant’s argument. But the ACLU’s amicus brief did stress “the right to privacy” and a 
dissent from Justice Harlan—who alongside Justice Douglas directly mentioned such a right—bore 
strong resemblance to Wolfenden’s thinking even as it drew an emphatic separation between 
marital privacy and homosexuality. To those lamenting that the court’s opinion saw an unripe case 
of “empty shadows,” dissents signaled a constitutional pathway forward if such a right could 
plausibly win more justices over.68  
If it remains unclear in what precise ways the Supreme Court justices encountered 
Wolfenden, strong currents of Anglo-American legal exchange that reinforced imagined legal 
kinship also increased the chances of direct contact. Harlan, for instance, was a former Rhodes 
scholar who had rhapsodized at the ABA’s 1957 London meeting about the “common legal 
heritage and free political institutions” through which “we have each achieved a society free from 
enforced conformity, and dedicated to the protection of individual rights, habits, points of view 
and tastes.” In August 1960, he was among those to welcome 1,500 British lawyers—including 
Wolfenden’s instigator, the now Lord Chancellor—to Washington following the first Commons 
debate on the homosexual proposals.69 Then, as the Supreme Court deliberated Poe v. Ullman, 
Harlan’s clerk spun off a memo arguing for marital privacy in constitutional language strikingly 
close to Wolfenden’s jurisprudential phraseology, even in implicitly disavowing the report’s policy 
conclusion. Acknowledging that it was not easy “to draw the line between public and private 
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1960), 356.  
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623-35 on Rittenour v. District of Columbia. In a sign of the interconnected stakes of the debate that some legal 
minds could see, this article notably cited an earlier unsuccessful challenge to Connecticut’s birth control statute, 
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morality” without “casting doubt on laws against homosexuality, adultery, fornication, etc.,” the 
memo solved the problem by suggesting the special character of marriage—a “natural state” before 
being “a creature of the state”—versus “outright sexual intimacy” that remained unprotected.”70 
And so Harlan’s eventual dissent held that Connecticut’s prohibition transgressed without 
sufficient reason a “most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty’” as recognized “by common 
understanding throughout the English-speaking world.” When Justice Brennan—who had affirmed 
the majority rejection in Poe—spoke to London’s Law Society shortly after on the topic of privacy 
he led with the birth control decision, acknowledging he had “difficulty in imagining a more 
indefensible invasion of privacy than an invasion of the marriage chamber by the government.”71 
But the same circuits encouraging Anglo-American legal ties and imaginaries ensured Wolfenden’s 
queer intervention was never far away. In 1961 Brennan formed part of a seven-man delegation of 
US jurists to Britain as part of an Anglo-American project comparing English and US appellate 
court systems, and was received by a team including erstwhile Wolfenden Committee member 
Kenneth Diplock—the lawyer who had invoked Hitler’s homosexual attacks.72 In 1962, Diplock 
repaid the visit, spending two days at the Supreme Court in close contact with the justices.73 
Law journals, law school talks, and institutional exchange all brought Wolfenden’s privacy 
principle to US shores and affected the atmosphere of the legal system at large, increasing sexual 
privacy’s legibility prior to Griswold. But for privacy to be realized as a constitutional right, it was 
not sufficient for it to appear a reasonable intellectual proposition; in recalibrating morality’s 
claims on law, privacy must overcome political factors constraining judicial articulation. For one 
thing, while contraceptives were widely available in Connecticut drug stores, powerful Catholic 
opposition morally opposed to birth control made law reform itself an unappealing campaign issue 
for politicians. Should the Supreme Court cut through legislative deadlock over birth control on 
the basis of a fundamental right, it therefore risked backlash from not only those supporting a 
contraception ban, but also those who feared judicial intervention overriding democracy. While 
birth control as an issue lacked the explosiveness of racial desegregation, the Supreme Court’s 
1954 Brown decision made any federal intervention in state politics a charged affair, perhaps 
especially when it came to the ultimate power of judicial review. Northern progressives alongside 
Southern resistors avidly monitored the Warren Court, the lead drafter of the ALI’s Model Penal 
Code accusing it of deviating from “neutral principles.” Invoking a right to privacy nowhere 
mentioned in the constitution invited another phrase rapidly gaining currency in US culture: 
judicial activism.74 
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By the early 1960s any so-called discovery of a fundamental right risked antagonizing both popular 
and professional US critics of judicial legislation. In 1962 Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous 
Branch strikingly articulated the “countermajoritarian difficulty” of judicial review in democracy, 
providing theoretical heft to those charging judicial activism of all but the narrowest rulings.75 And 
while Congress gave the Civil Rights Act of 1964 democratic endorsement, the authority of the 
federal legislature to enforce these measures remained fiercely contested. Reflecting this pressure 
was a widely publicized speech by Justice Harlan that summer, which—though opening with 
“Magna Carta, that famed fountainhead of individual liberty”—reassured those unsettled by recent 
legislation that there “is no such thing in our constitutional jurisprudence as a doctrine of civil 
rights at large standing independent of other constitutional limitations or giving rise to rights born 
out of the personal predilections of judges.” He further concluded that “our federalism not only 
tolerates, but encourages, differences between Federal and State protection of individual rights”. 
Harlan’s words might render his own dissent in Poe vulnerable.76 
But here the ongoing stateside dissemination of Wolfenden’s privacy principle made a 
crucial difference—over and above long-term claims of tort privacy, which had not resulted in a 
constitutional right, and the obviously recent innovations in search and seizure protections. 
Although starting life as a call for homosexual law reform, Wolfenden’s elaboration by Hart and 
others as a more general Anglo-American commitment to liberty in privacy helped provide enough 
of a seemingly neutral principle for the Supreme Court to surmount this significant hurdle. 
Magnified by the powerful engine of US legal institutions, Hart’s jurisprudential 
elaboration of his position was a particularly significant factor turning sexual privacy into a core, 
even traditional, legal principle. While responses to the British judge Devlin dominated the first 
stage of debate, Hart’s February 1962 lectures at Stanford—published in 1963 as Law, Liberty and 
Morality—reversed the momentum, asserting a distinctive liberal philosophical vision. Targeting the 
harmful infringements of liberty caused by moralistic regulation of sexual lives, Hart glanced at a 
potential solution by noting that in the United States “the rights of individuals are protected to 
some extent from the majorities by a written constitution.”77 Until then, rights had not featured 
much in the exchange with Devlin, but the US context brought the term into Hart’s remarks at a 
moment when African-American organizing forced a sharp spike in rights talk more generally.78   
Rather than seizing on expediency, however, Hart’s broadside undercut sexual morality 
laws through jurisprudential principles it argued were of fundamental character, with long 
traditions in Anglo-American law and society. While Devlin’s tagline of “intolerance, indignation, 
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and disgust” became a lightning rod for critique of his whole position as contrary to “the Anglo-
American concept of the individual as autonomous entity” (as one Yale Law Journal article put it, 
immediately citing the Wolfenden Report),79 even those who judged Hart “as an ‘activist’ as well as 
a scholar” and complained about “special pleading” for homosexual law reform could admit he 
clarified thinking on law’s reach more generally. Tellingly, two significant criminal law textbooks 
published in 1962 prominently featured homosexual privacy and implicitly invited constitutional 
reappraisal, the field-shaping Criminal Law and Its Processes highlighting “the great issue of the 
reconciliation of the authority and the individual,” then opening with a section framed around 
Wolfenden and the Hart-Devlin debate. The strength of Hart’s impact is further indicated by his 
reception in Notre Dame’s Natural Law Forum—not the most likely venue to embrace the positivist 
Hart—where a reviewer praised his “restrained and subtle discussion” that was “outstanding in 
importance,” again quoting Wolfenden’s privacy principle while affirming that “[n]obody would 
assert that this Committee…was indifferent to the preservation of moral standards.” In these ways, 
restraining morality’s imposition through law could present itself as more faithful to the 
fundamental tenets of US society than statutes prohibiting sodomy, let alone birth control.80      
A variety of advocates now drew on Wolfenden and Hart actively to forge connections 
between abstract privacy and applied constitutional protection. Those concerned by psychiatry’s 
encroachment on civil liberties, for instance, would find the Wolfenden Report prominently 
deployed in defense of constitutional protections by Thomas Szasz’s popular 1963 polemic Law, 
Psychiatry, and Morality, with its one-word flip of Hart’s title. That year legal scholar Louis Henkin 
(later a prominent US theorist of human rights) drew on the Hart-Devlin debate’s escalation in his 
prominent article “Morals and the Constitution.” Although focused on Supreme Court obscenity 
decisions, this piece not only drew links between privacy and the constitution, but also lobbied the 
Supreme Court to recognize them in practice. Its conclusion indeed forcefully deployed 
Wolfenden and Hart to call for constitutional intervention to protect civil liberties from the 
enforcement of morals:  
 
When we deal not with physical injury to ourselves but with “sin,” respectable and authoritative 
voices are increasingly heard that there exists “a realm of private morality and immorality which is, 
in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business.” Should not the Supreme Court today, or tomorrow, 
consider whether under the Constitution some morality, at least, may be not the law’s business and 
not appropriate support for legislation consistent with due process of law? 
 
Quoting the Wolfenden Report, Henkin trumpeted “the philosophers” and portentously 
remarked that if “the court will not look afresh at obscenity laws, particularly in its private aspects,” 
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perhaps it would do so in birth control cases.81  
 Wolfenden, Hart, and their transatlantic legacies had made a difference in how 
fundamental a right to privacy might seem. Although the Supreme Court would exclude so 
stigmatized a practice as gay sex from that realm, a sharp increase in homosexuality’s prominence 
as a discussion point in US culture ensured Wolfenden’s continued topicality immediately before 
Griswold. LIFE’s groundbreaking 1964 feature on “Homosexuality in America” was far from 
unusual in referring to the now seven-year old report directly.82 Homophiles, meanwhile, 
continued to deploy it to secure allies. Indeed, the Daughters of Bilitis research committee 
chairwoman put Wolfenden top of the list when in February 1965 lesbian activist Barbara Gittings 
asked for references to take to a meeting with an ACLU representative that “will give strong 
support for this possible ACLU statement to pull down the government’s barriers to full equality 
for homosexuals.” Consequently, political opponents were also forced to grapple with Wolfenden, 
as the New York Academy of Medicine did in 1964 and the federal Civil Service Commission 
would do two years later.83 In between, as the justices limbered up to hear oral arguments in 1965, 
they may have seen a new series on homosexuality on the front page of the Washington Post, which 
noted that there had “been much ‘cry Wolfenden’ since the British Parliament received the 
report.” They may not have done, of course. Yet Wolfenden’s public presence in the United States 
had made a signal contribution to crystalizing a pressing question percolating through culture and 
channeled by the Post as: “Should law reach into the bedroom and the area of private morals?”84 
Estelle Griswold’s legal team wisely offered the Supreme Court a range of grounds on 
which to intervene, but privacy now anchored their main argument. Given Harlan’s warning shot 
regarding the right’s bounds, homosexuality and Wolfenden remained unmentioned and the 
menu of judicial remedies even suggested striking down the law on the basis that its implied moral 
position was outside the majority views in the community. But the main brief ultimately urged a 
more “fundamental” solution, concluding that the court had likely never had a statute before it 
“which touched so drastically and so arbitrarily upon so many fundamental rights of the citizen.” It 
followed this claim with a long, rousing section on a constitutional right to privacy that, while 
grounded in the site of the marital home, countered more than physical invasion, appealing to a 
protected realm of private—albeit normative—morality. It was “the sanctity of the home,” the brief 
argued, where “‘the right to be let alone’ becomes most meaningful and precious”. This and the 
“wholly personal nature of marital relations” formed “the inner core of the right to privacy.” 
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Supplemented by an ACLU amicus brief that once again stressed a right to privacy protecting (in 
Brandeis’s words) “Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their 
sensations,” the legal team emphasized that Connecticut’s moralistic statute threatened “the 
fundamental rights of privacy of married couples.” Its lead lawyer in oral arguments further 
asserted a “field where the individual is entitled to some private sector against which government is 
forbidden to intrude” that was more of a decisional than a physical domain. Protecting a “right to 
decide whether to have children voluntarily,” it encompassed—for married couples, at least—the 
choice to have sex that did not lead to procreation, no matter what the community thought.85          
 Enough had happened since Poe to incline the Supreme Court to see a right to privacy as a 
reasonable path. Historians and legal scholars are prone to fetishize the judicial archive of Supreme 
Court decisions, and Griswold’s has been mined more than most. But while conference records, 
memos, and multiple drafts of the majority decision all testify to the contingencies of this ruling, 
they only reveal so much about the shifting atmosphere enabling sexual privacy’s identification and 
articulation.86 By making a right to privacy more intuitive in US legal circles and even broader 
publics, the transatlantic vector of Wolfenden’s privacy paradigm played a critical if somewhat 
covert role in rendering Griswold conceptually and politically plausible. In this light, the decision’s 
famous encomium to marriage (written by multiple divorcee Justice Douglas) seems less a 
straightforward reflection of its age than a reflex establishing distance from a suspect heritage, for 
which it substituted the supposedly timeless value of marital intimacy. Locating the “zone of 
privacy” in the “penumbras” of “several fundamental constitutional guarantees,” the court not 
only avoided binding itself too closely to any particular line of cases that could dictate future 
decisions, but also covered the tracks of its jurisprudence. Three of the four justices joining 
Douglas’s majority opinion nevertheless felt enough discomfort with its “emanations” to sign on to 
a concurring opinion that specifically cited Harlan’s remarks in Poe on homosexuality. Regardless 
of whether the justices self-consciously sensed Wolfenden lurking in Griswold’s penumbras, the 
rhapsodic praise of marriage and explicit exclusion of homosexuality indicated why this US 
constitutional right did not constitute a “realm of private morality and immorality” extending even 
so far as contraceptive use by unmarried couples, let alone other “perversions.”87 
 Onlooking lawyers though quickly apprehended sexual privacy’s potential to burst beyond 
marital bedrooms. The Harvard Law Review commented on Griswold’s bearing on broader sexual 
liberties directly after the decision.88 A little later, the appellant’s lead lawyer speculated that, over 
time, “all sexual activities of consenting adults will be brought within the right of privacy.”89 A 
1966 UCLA Law Review study on the policing of homosexuals thought that “Griswold may 
foreshadow eventual judicial recognition of the right of consenting adults to engage privately in 
                                                        
85 Appellate Brief, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). Thomas Emerson, 29 March 1965, oral argument before Supreme Court in 
Griswold v. Connecticut in Roy M. Mersky and Jill Duffy, A Documentary History of the Legal Aspects of Abortion 
in the United States: Griswold v. Connecticut (Littleton: Fred B. Rother Publications, 2001).   
86 Garrow’s account in Liberty and Sexuality provides the most comprehensive account of the Supreme Court’s 
backroom machinery in this case. For a helpful analysis of doctrinal innovation that facilitated the form of Douglas’s 
majority opinion (but does not mention Wolfenden or Hart-Devlin), see Ryan C. Williams, “The Paths to Griswold,” 
Nortre Dame Law Review 89:5, 2155-88.    
87 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
88 “The Supreme Court, 1964 Term,” Harvard Law Review 79 (1965), 103. See Thomas C. Grey, “Eros, Civilization 
and the Burger Court,” Law and Contemporary Problems 43:3 (Summer 1980), 83-100.   
89 Thomas I. Emerson, “Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,” Michigan Law Review 64:219 (1965), 219-34. 
   
 23 
any form of sexual behavior.”90 Meanwhile, a lawyer giving a presentation at a San Francisco 
homophile group called the Society for Individual Rights asked his audience to consider whether 
Griswold’s “zone of privacy” extended to them.91  
Homophile leaders disagreed on this question and some harbored significant doubts about 
the politics of privacy itself. While homophile magazine editor Clark Polak was optimistic about 
Griswold’s implications for the movement, fellow activist Barbara Gittings believed “that 
homosexuals are far more likely to suffer from laws that allow authority to restrict homosexuals’ 
assembly and communication than from laws against specific sex acts.”92 Furthermore, although 
Gittings acquired Hart’s Law, Liberty, and Morality–lending it out to fellow homophile trailblazer 
Frank Kameny—she also apparently underlined a 1965 review asserting that Hart was “deeply a 
conservative” and “ready to tolerate deviant sexual behavior, kept discreetly from public view, 
because, and to the extent that, it does not jeopardize the legal system and the basic social 
establishment”.93 In San Francisco, the lawyer lecturing homophiles in Griswold’s wake quickly 
moved from privacy to other concerns, including “the sex psychopath issue” and the policing of 
homosexuals by easily prosecuted misdemeanors.94 And in New York, the chair of the Mattachine 
Society’s legal committee, enthusiastically noted the new likelihood in England of “fundamental 
legal reform” based on the Wolfenden Report, but directed more attention to a US test case 
regarding the legality of gay bars and to new solicitation provisions that he feared would increase 
homosexual arrests.95 Indeed, perhaps the biggest irony of Wolfenden’s Atlantic crossing was that 
its essential division between decriminalizing private homosexuality while increasing penalties for 
female streetwalking might in the United States lead to the revocation of sodomy laws that caught 
few gay men while strengthening solicitation statutes that caught many.96  
 Yet Griswold also brought out why Wolfenden remained a political weapon of unsurpassed 
stature in US homophile politics. When TIME in January 1966 acknowledged the report to be 
“invariably the model cited,” it rejected Wolfenden’s advocates in part by lamenting the “pathetic 
little pseudo marriages in which many homosexuals act out conventional roles.” Homophile 
activist Frank Kameny hit back, defending the privacy principle against brutally penalizing “adults 
who have engaged in private, consensual sexual acts, or acts of love, which have no adverse 
consequences”. Where TIME in effect placed emphatic distance between gay relationships and the 
“sacred” bond Griswold now protected, Kameny’s defense of Wolfenden drew a pointed 
connection between “private, consensual sexual acts” and “acts of love”.97 If Wolfenden promoted 
gay civil liberties at the expense of legal moralism, it also—and for better or worse—performed its 
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own boosterism for the private sphere. For many in the postwar homophile movement, privacy’s 
equation with intimacy spoke to some deeply felt desire for public validation of personal lives and 
feelings. Beyond Griswold’s constitutional recognition of privacy, what TIME dubbed “The 
Wolfenden Problem” spoke to them about more than rights.  
 
When Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in 1873 that it was better to draw a line “somewhere in the 
penumbra between darkness and light, than to remain in uncertainty,” the metaphor he promoted 
begged its own annihilation. Divergent patterns of legal precedent unleashed shadowy gradients of 
ambiguity; clear bright lines, applied by justices, drew towards resolution.98 
Griswold’s shadow play, however, came freighted with a different implication: that 
penumbras themselves might inhabit—and be deployed by—judicial articulations. If creeping 
darkness was unsettling, it also proved powerful when deliberately sustained. During his 
subsequent Supreme Court career, Holmes cast words comprising the US constitution as “the skin 
of a living thought,” rather than as transparent and unchanging crystals, and his perception of 
constitutional penumbras came to justify rights made out by implication.99 By early 1973, the court 
had extended a penumbral “right to privacy” beyond married couples to contraceptive use by single 
people and to abortion.100 Controversy, of course, continued to attach itself to such shadow 
agency, both in regard to its jurisprudential operation and to particular un-enumerated rights. 
Critics also attacked privacy’s limited or skewed intervention in power dynamics.101 Even 
supporters of the right to privacy as applied to sexual and reproductive politics disagreed over how 
the light and shade fell or could feel discomfort about the precariousness of such shadow lands. 
Whatever the legitimacy of penumbras in US constitutional law, dwelling in penumbral 
spaces combining uncertainty and substance—where the half-seen is encountered as no mere 
distraction—has its benefits for historians. More legalistic minds might hanker for the secure 
jurisdiction and the bounded concerns that delineate Wolfenden’s recommendations on 
homosexual offences as irrelevant to the recognition of so heteronormative a US marital right. Yet 
if penumbras imply a performance of judgment that is more strained than many lawyers might 
like, they also invite queerer modes of interpretation. Embracing rather than excusing the 
penumbras of Griswold sheds a significantly different light on a discrete moment of rule-bound 
decision-making that had ostentatiously distanced itself from queerness. And it suggests shadowy 
implications stretching into legal history and beyond. Law may possess a particular talent for 
implying a total universe of state and professional institutions, penmanship, and precedent, which 
penumbras can open up. The playful effervescences of queer history and aesthetics, however, stand 
usefully to unsettle anyone able to imagine dark, enclosed closets as seemingly boundless and 
spectacular with just a crack of light. Perverting established origins stories regarding a US right to 
sexual privacy airs the covert revelations and denied intimations that recur in queer navigations 
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across public and private. Even so radiant a subject as a supreme court may reveal a shady side 
when subjected to Sedgwick’s concern for the complexities of “knowing and unknowing, 
recognition and misrecognition” – problems that have long inspired scholars of lesbian and gay 
history in analyzing the social roles of double lives and transgressions of less-than-separate 
spheres.102        
My insistence on the tonal drama of Griswold’s chiaroscuro floats a number of conceptual 
coordinates for historians to consider when approaching penumbras in their sources or pursuing a 
penumbral approach: the re-envisioning prompted by stimulating uncertainty, the dawning 
gradations that raise suspicion of binary extremes, the darker angles that add depth to the flatly 
floodlit, and the challenge of the seemingly liminal to governing epistemes. But given its 
intersections with “privacy” as a matter of both personal autonomy and information control, 
another crepuscular dynamic is worth elaborating here—one that arises from the generative tension 
between willfully abject queer subjects and overbearing haloes of definition. Michel Foucault’s 
1978 rumination on the “Lives of Infamous Men” invoked historical encounters with power 
through a penetrating light beam that momentarily snatched otherwise obscure persons “from the 
darkness of night where they could, and still should perhaps, have been able to remain.” The flash 
of law’s rule was among the power-knowledge mechanisms that produced a legacy of “dark 
legends” and “lightning existences,” briefly looming up “from the shadows.” Extrapolations from 
Foucault’s disciplinary perspective have greatly influenced approaches to historical records and 
actors among queer scholars and many others. But while the terrible reach of legal and other 
governmental systems to cultivate taxonomies, shape inner lives, and determine pasts has often 
proved itself disturbingly efficacious, liberationist cries for full exposure through “coming out” into 
a gay world of sunshine also rang beyond the 1970s and shouldn’t simply be dismissed as a foil. A 
gay lib historical narrative that culminates in authentic and world-changing self-representation may 
feel hopelessly outclassed by sophisticated disciplinary determinism, yet the co-dependence 
between discipline and emancipation discloses a twilight space that conjoins as well as divides 
these distinctive accounts. The Supreme Court’s recognition of a US right to privacy may appear 
an inherently top-down process, but the imperfect and tantalizing field of perception presented by 
penumbras at least admits the potential for a kind of influence from the semi-darkness below.103   
While Victor Stoichita has urged art historians to see shadow as not merely absence but the 
very ground making forms of vision possible, historians themselves still have much to reckon with 
about the prospects and perils of visibility in the penumbral spaces of records and imaginaries. 
There they may discover alternate visions of both artistry and change over time. In terms of the 
queer development of a US constitutional right to privacy that did not extend to gay sex until 
2003, there remains a paradox to underline, for as legal scholars paid greater attention to potential 
constitutional protections for gay people in the 1970s, the chance of the Supreme Court 
recognizing same-sex intimacy as a fundamental right receded.104 In outline, this can be attributed 
to the more conservative personnel of the Burger Court, backlash after Roe v. Wade against 
“judicial activism,” and homosexuality’s potency as an issue of cultural warfare up to and beyond 
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the start of the US AIDS crisis. There is though something symptomatic about the abatement of 
Wolfenden’s jurisprudential legacy that backlights the dynamics of the Supreme Court’s original 
penumbral encounter. Glanced at askance, Wolfenden enabled constitutional emanations; viewed 
directly, it threatened the rarefied domain of constitutional protections.  
To look into Griswold’s penumbras is not only to appreciate the complexity and ambiguity 
of a legal decision, but also to recalibrate our sense of what illuminates its history. Homophiles, 
with their pseudonymous personas, their members-only forums, their enshadowed TV 
appearances, and their generally marginalized presence are not always easy to picture as either 
enlightened or enlightening historical actors. Yet in forming a social movement whose public 
aspirations necessarily wrestled with the political purchase of privacy, they were perhaps even 
better placed than Supreme Court justices to understand that “harmless, empty shadows” could 
turn out to be nothing of the kind.  
